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I. INTRODUCTION
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.' illustrates a recent reformulation of the private attorney
general model for enforcing federal laws.2 In the case, decided January 15, 2008, the
Court rejected another attempt to expand scheme liability in private securities ac-
tions to create a new class of defendants.3 In doing so, the Court's opinion, written
by Justice Anthony Kennedy, recognized possible harms from unfettered private
enforcement4 and described alternative methods of deterring bad behavior-
namely state law and government enforcement.' This follows a recent perceived
pattern in securities and antitrust cases to scale back (and decline to expand) the
* Carl W. Hittinger is a partner in the litigation group at DLA Piper in its Philadelphia office, where he
concentrates his trial and appellate practice in complex commercial litigation with particular emphasis on
antitrust and unfair competition matters. Hittinger is also a frequent lecturer and writer on antitrust issues and
has extensive experience over the past twenty-nine years counseling clients on all aspects of civil and criminal
antitrust law. He can be reached at 215-656-2449, or carl.hittinger@dlapiper.com.
- Jarod M. Bona is an appellate and trial litigator in DLA Piper's Minneapolis office. His practice focuses
on complex commercial litigation, particularly antitrust and class action matters. In addition to counseling
clients on antitrust issues, Bona frequently writes antitrust articles for law journals and magazines. He can be
reached at 612-524-3049, or jarod.bona@dlapiper.com.
I. 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 766 ("We conclude the implied right of action does not reach the customer/supplier companies
because the investors did not rely upon their statements or representations."). The Court previously rejected
aiding and abetting liability in Rule 10b-5 cases in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994) ("Because the text of§ 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)."). The Court held,
however, that secondary actors could be liable under that section, "assuming all of the requirements for pri-
mary liability under Rule 10b-5 are met." Id. The Stoneridge plaintiff, of course, employed that opening to
bring its lawsuit. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 769 ("The conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the
elements or preconditions for liabilityl.l").
4. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772. The Court cited the decision in Blue Chip for the proposition that
"extensive discovery and the potential for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak
claims to extort settlements from innocent companies." Id. at 772 (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975)).
5. Id. at 773-74 (describing alternatives to the implied private right of action under the Securities and
Exchange Act in the form of government enforcement).
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powers of private attorneys general to enforce federal law through class action law-
suits.6 Stoneridge and other recent cases do not represent the beginning of the end
for these class actions, but instead suggest that the Supreme Court is taking a more
nuanced (and perhaps cautious) approach to the private attorney general model by
limiting its expansion in areas where harm could exceed benefits, and providing
courts with greater ability to weed out unmeritorious cases earlier in the litigation.7
This article will begin in Part II.A. by describing the private attorney general
model-both what it is and how it developed in the securities and antitrust class
action arena.' Part II.B. examines the private attorney general model in the context
of the federal securities laws.' Next, Part II.C. details the subject case, Stoneridge,
and scheme liability under the securities laws.' Finally, in Part II.D., we describe
the Supreme Court's refinement of the private attorney general model in securities
and antitrust cases in particular."
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Private Attorney General Model
One form of the private attorney general is a class action attorney who sues a
defendant on behalf of a group of private citizens. 2 This attorney"sues to vindicate
the public interest by representing" a group of individuals who either cannot afford
the costs of litigation or whose stake is so small that litigation would not be cost-
effective.' 3 Instead of receiving direct payment from the clients, the attorney-if
successful-receives a portion of the award. * Many of these cases are settled prior
to trial with approval of the court and the parties will negotiate the attorneys' fees
6. See generally Jennifer I. Johnson & Edward Brunet, Critiquing Arbitration of Shareholder Claims, 36
SEC. REG. L.J. 181, 183-85 (2008) (critiquing U.S. securities litigation and describing how the recent Supreme
Court decisions in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 124 S. Ct. 2499, 2504-05 (2007) and Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) "strictly interpreted" congressional reforms to
heighten pleading standards and encourage dismissal of meritless claims).
7. See id. at 183-85 (noting that "Congress... placed quite severe procedural restrictions upon securities
class actions" but that "filings in securities class actions continue at a robust rate and settlements have hit all
time highs").
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part lI.B.
10. See infra Part I1.C.
11. See infra Part II.D.
12. William B. Rubenstein, On What a "Private Attorney General" is-And Why it Matters, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 2129, 2148 (2004) (describing the various types of private attorneys general). Rubenstein, in his excellent
article, describes three forms of private attorneys general, but this paper will focus on the private attorney
general as supplemental law enforcer-class action attorneys. Id. at 2142-55.
13. John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty
Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 216 (1983) ("[A]s every law student knows, our society places
extensive reliance upon such private attorneys general to enforce the federal antitrust and securities laws, to
challenge corporate self-dealing in derivative actions, and to protect a host of other statutory policies.").
14. See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 2148-49 (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 129 (6th ed. 1990)) (ex-
plaining that "a successful private [attorney general] is entitled to recover ... attorneys fees[ I if he has ad-
vanced the policy inherent in public interest legislation" for a class of plaintiffs).
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as part of the settlement. 5 Indeed, because of the high costs of litigating and the
risks of a very large adverse award, along with the delays in civil judicial proceed-
ings, both plaintiff attorneys 6 and defendants 7 have strong incentives to settle.'8
The prospect of these often large fees creates an incentive for plaintiff attorneys to
file lawsuits on behalf of proposed class members. 9 In fact, these incentives have
created a cottage industry for lawyers and plaintiffs who compete to fulfill this
"private attorney general" function."
These lawsuits can both compensate deserving plaintiffs and deter illegal con-
duct.' Conventionally, compensation is considered a private goal, and deterrence a
public goal,2 but in reality, actions by both private and public attorneys can lead to
both compensation and deterrence.22 For example, the Stoneridge Court noted that
"[s]ince September 30, 2002, SEC enforcement actions have collected over $10 bil-
lion in disgorgement and penalties, much of it for distribution to injured inves-
tors."24 And in another recent securities litigation decision, the Supreme Court
reiterated that "meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities
laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement
actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC)."2
15. Coffee, supra note 13, at 230.
16. Id. at 226, 230. In fact, one of Coffee's critiques of the private attorney general model is that plaintiffs'
attorneys are more risk adverse than their clients and thus more likely to settle than would be in their clients'
interests. Id. at 230.
17. Thomas F. Gillespie III, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo: A Missed Opportunity to Right the
Wrongs in the PSLRA and Rebalance the Private Rule lOb-5 Litigation Playing Field, 3 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 161,
175-76 (2008) ("Plaintiffs counsel ... know that if they can survive a pre-trial dismissal, the public company
defendant will almost assuredly, as a business decision, settle for a significant sum regardless of the strength of
the plaintiffs' underlying claims.") (citing S. REV. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 ("[U]nder the current system, the initiative for filing 10b-5 suits comes almost entirely
from the lawyers, not from genuine investors.") (alteration in original)).
18. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the Role of the Plaintiff, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Autumn 1997, at 167, 168 (describing how the "disparity between the stake of plaintiffs' counsel in the litiga-
tion and the stakes of the class members gives rise to a variety of agency problems" including the motivation to
settle).
19. See id. (noting that "class action litigation [may] produce handsome compensation for class counsel"
and fee awards, often based on judicial determinations rather than market forces, frequently exceed the dam-
ages recovered by members of the plaintiff class).
20. Coffee, supra note 13, at 223 ("Typically, the sequence begins with an SEC injunctive action or an
antitrust indictment, which within a brief period elicits a horde of plaintiffs' attorney-sometimes numbering
well over l00-all seeking to participate in a private class action, the allegations of which largely parallel and
sometimes literally parrot those set forth in the agency's complaint."); Gillespie, supra note 17, at 174.
21. Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 2140.
22. Id. ("[Pirivate attorneys pursue compensation for individual clients arising out of past injuries (torts,
breaches of contracts, discriminatory harms, financial losses) while public attorneys aim to deter future bad
behavior.").
23. Id.
24. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773 (2008).
25. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
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As the Supreme Court noted, private class action lawsuits can supplement gov-
ernment enforcement of federal law, particularly the antitrust and securities laws.26
This "private attorney general" concept is based upon the idea that governmental
authorities have neither the time nor the resources to bring enforcement actions
against all wrongdoers.27
The phrase "private attorney general" was first coined by Second Circuit Judge
Jerome Frank in 1943.2" Justice William Douglas cited Jhdge Frank in using the
term in a Supreme Court dissent several months later.2 9 The term remained some-
what dormant, however, until the 1970s, when its use started to skyrocket." Now
the term is part of legal lexicon and regularly employed by judges and scholars
throughout the country." Although the phrase can denote a wide range of private
attorneys that serve the public interest, these unfortunately sometimes include
profit-seeking private attorneys who bring baseless class action lawsuits to enforce
federal laws.32 Professor Coffee described these attorneys as "bounty hunters" in his
1983 article on the subject.3 The theory is that these bounty hunters are private
attorneys general in that they are induced by profit motive to seek out cases that
government enforcers either miss or do not have the resources (or desire) to
prosecute."
B. Private Attorneys General and the Federal Securities Laws
Private attorneys general have been particularly active in the securities law arena
since the U.S. Supreme Court created an implied private cause of action from sec-
tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." This private cause of action
26. Id.; see also Coffee, supra note 13, at 216.
27. Barbara Black, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.: Reliance on Deceptive Conduct
and the Future of Securities Fraud Class Actions, 36 SEC. REG. L.J. 330, 338 (2008) ("[Elmpirical studies make
clear that the SEC cannot investigate and bring enforcement actions against all corporate wrongdoers; the
concept of the private plaintiffs acting as a 'private attorney general' as a necessary supplement to the SEC's
enforcement powers maintains its vitality.") (citations omitted).
28. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943) ("Such persons, so
authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals."), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943); Coffee, supra note 13,
at 215; Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 2133.
29. FCC v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 319 U.S. 239, 265 n.I (1943) (Douglas, I., dissenting); Rubenstein, supra note
12, at 2130 n.2.
30. Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 2130.
31. Id. at 2130, 2134.
32. Id. at 2142-55. Another example of private attorneys general includes experienced private attorneys
who are directly hired by a government entity to litigate, as occurred in both the tobacco cases and Microsoft
antitrust litigation. Id. at 2143.
33. Coffee, supra note 13, at 218.
34. Id. at 220. The Third Circuit in Garr upheld Rule II sanctions against typical "bounty hunters" for
failing to make a reasonable inquiry before signing their securities complaint. Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 22
F.3d 1274, 1281 (3d Cir. 1994). This decision provides an excellent description of how this "bounty hunter"
theory works in practice, and can be criticized by the courts. Id. at 1275-78.
35. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). Interestingly, the Stoneridge Court notes that under current
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allows a plaintiff to sue any person who violates SEC Rule 10b-5, which makes it
unlawful:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.36
To prevail under this implied private action, "a plaintiff must prove (1) a mate-
rial misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6)
loss causation."37 The "bounty hunters" or "private attorneys general" usually sue
officers, controlling shareholders, and directors of a corporation, but it is the cor-
poration, and sometimes its insurer, that pays the settlement." Indeed, plaintiffs
often sue these corporate insiders specifically to gain access to their insurance.39
Class action filings under Rule lob-5 accelerated after 1988 when the Supreme
Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson created a presumption of reliance (element four,
above) for securities lawsuits traded in secondary public markets." This is known
as the "fraud-on-the-market" theory," which "is based on the hypothesis that, in an
open and developed securities market, the price of a company's stock is determined
by the available material information regarding the company and its business."' 2 As
a result, this theory presumes that misleading statements will "defraud purchasers
of stock even if the purchasers do not directly rely on the misstatements.' Thus, in
these circumstances, a court may presume that individual plaintiffs relied upon the
misstatement, even if they did not do so directly.44 This presumption is extremely
law, the Court would not find an implied cause of action unless "the underlying statute can be interpreted to
disclose the intent to create one," which is not the case with respect to section 10(b). Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at
768.
36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
37. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768 (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005)).
38. John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementa-
tion, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1550-51 (2006).
39. Id. at 1551.
40. 485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988); A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-At-
lanta, Inc.: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform I (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 08-010, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 159983.
41. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1.
42. Basic, 485 U.S. at 241 (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1986)).
43. Id. at 241-42.
44. Id. at 242.
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important for the proliferation of private attorneys general because the reliance
element would otherwise be a major barrier to class certification." This is because
the fraud-on-the-market theory transforms reliance from an individual issue
(proving direct reliance) into a common issue (presuming reliance for a class of
stock purchasers). 6 Without this presumption, individual issues may predominate
over common issues, leading courts to reject motions for class certification.47 At the
same time, this presumption greatly expands the size of the class and potential
amount of damages, and makes the lawsuit more valuable to the plaintiffs' attor-
ney.48 Indeed, because of the enormous trading volume in secondary markets, the
recoverable damages could reach hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars.49
Congress reacted to the flood of securities litigation in 1995 by passing the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA).5° In addition to other procedural
provisions, the PSLRA "created heightened pleading requirements for the misrepre-
sentation and scienter elements of a Rule 10b-5 claim."'" These restrictions led
plaintiffs deciding to bring a lawsuit to "focus on objective evidence, such as re-
statements, insider trading, and SEC enforcement actions ....52 As recent cases
demonstrate, however, this statute was not sufficient to eliminate concerns about
abusive class actions.5" Ironically, Congress and the SEC have faced recent criticism
from the current economic crisis and Wall Street bailout for insufficient oversight
over so-called abusive business practices.54
C. Stoneridge and Scheme Liability
In Stoneridge, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Rule 10b-5 implied right of
action "does not reach the customer/supplier companies because the investors did
45. See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt I11, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 REV. LITIG.
405, 409-10, 412 (2003) (explaining the "paradigm case" for class certification and that "[pllaintiffs who can-
not rely on the fraud-on-the- market theory face an uphill battle in seeking certification").
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("[Qluestions of law or fact common to class members [mustl
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ...."); see also Paul G. Mahony, Precaution
Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 625 (1992) (arguing that the fraud-on-
the-market theory should be replaced with a requirement of individualized proof of reliance in 10b-5 suits in
order to maximize deterrence under fraud liability).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("[Qluestions of law or fact common to class members [must]
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members ...."); see also Pritchard, supra note 40, at
31 ("Requiring plaintiffs to plead actual reliance largely eliminates class actions, leaving fraud deterrence exclu-
sively in the hands of the SEC and the Justice Department.").
48. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 5.
49. Id. at 9.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2006); see also Gillespie, supra note 17, at 167.
51. Gillespie, supra note 17, at 167-68.
52. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 31.
53. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007) ("Private securities fraud
actions, however, if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on com-
panies and individuals whose conduct conforms to the law.").
54. See Jim Popkin, Critics Say Bailout is Stuffed with Billions in Pork, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 3, 2008, available
at http://deepbackground.msnbc.msn.com/archive/2008/10/03/1489413.aspx.
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not rely upon their statements or representations.' 5 In other words, the Court
rejected the plaintiffs attempt to stretch federal securities liability to certain secon-
dary actors."
Stoneridge involved a motion to dismiss a Rule 10b-5 class action that was origi-
nally filed against Charter Communications and other defendants, including two of
Charter's suppliers and customers.57 The Court's decision concerned liability for
these two secondary actors.5 8 Plaintiffs alleged that "Charter, a cable operator, en-
gaged in a variety of fraudulent practices so its quarterly reports would meet Wall
Street expectations for cable subscriber growth and operating cash flow." 9 Accord-
ing to the complaint, the "fraud included misclassification of its customer base;
delayed reporting of terminated customers; improper capitalization of costs that
should have been shown as expenses; and manipulation of the company's billing
cutoff dates to inflate reported revenues."' The secondary actors "supplied Charter
with the digital cable converter (set top) boxes that Charter furnished to its cus-
tomers.' Plaintiffs alleged that the secondary actors contributed to the fraud by
agreeing to accept $20 more from Charter for each set top box, in exchange for
purchasing advertising from Charter.62 The transactions were a wash and had no"economic substance," but Charter allegedly recorded the advertising "as revenue
and capitalized its purchase of the set top boxes, in violation of generally accepted
accounting principles . .6.1.3 This, plaintiffs alleged, allowed "Charter to fool its
auditor into approving a financial statement showing it met projected revenue and
operating cash flow numbers."64 The secondary actors "had no role in preparing or
disseminating Charter's financial statements. And their own financial statements
booked the transactions as a wash, under generally accepted accounting
principles." '65
The Supreme Court concluded that "respondents' deceptive acts, which were not
disclosed to the investing public, were too remote to satisfy the requirement of
reliance."6' The fraud-on-the-market theory that presumed reliance did not apply
here because defendants were secondary actors, and "[n]o member of the investing
public had knowledge, either actual or presumed, of respondents' deceptive acts
55. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 766 (2008).
56. See id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 767.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 770.
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during the relevant times. 67 The Court's decision was infused with policy.6" For
example, it expressed concern that plaintiffs sought to apply securities liability "be-
yond the securities markets-the realm of financing business-to purchase and
supply contracts-the realm of ordinary business operations."9
Almost fifteen years earlier, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A.,7  the Supreme Court substantially narrowed potential securi-
ties liability for secondary actors when it rejected aiding and abetting liability for
Rule 10b-5 actions.7" Since the 10b-5 action is a judicially-created implied cause of
action, the Court had "to infer how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the
issue[s] had the 10b-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act."72 In doing so, the Court pointed out that a "private plaintiff may not bring a
10b-5 suit against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text of § 10(b)."7 And
section 10(b) does not mention aiding and abetting.74 The Court disposed of argu-
ments that aiding and abetting liability was implied based upon general principles
of tort law, and declined to expand the cause of action beyond acts prohibited by
section 10(b)'s text.75 While the Court based its decision on the statute's text, it did
point out that "[s]econdary liability for aiders and abettors exacts costs that may
disserve the goals of fair dealing and efficiency in the securities markets." '76
The Central Bank Court did, however, leave an opening for secondary actor
liability:
Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator
under lOb-5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule
lOb-5 are met.77
67. Id. at 769.
68. Black, supra note 27, at 335.
69. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770.
70. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
71. Id. at 191 ("Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we hold that a private
plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)."). Interestingly, after Central Bank was
decided, Congress amended section 20 of the Exchange Act to allow the SEC to enforce aiding and abetting
liability against control persons. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2006); Eric Berry, Note, Stoneridge and the Short-Lived Exper-
iment of Scheme Liability, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 355, 362-63 (2007). It is notable that Congress did not permit
private attorneys general to enforce aiding and abetting liability. Id. at 363.
72. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S.
286, 294 (1993)) (alteration in original).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 175.
75. Id. at 181-85.
76. Id. at 188.
77. Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
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Indeed, this is the opening that plaintiffs in Stoneridge sought to exploit." And the
Court, following Central Bank, required plaintiffs to fulfill "each of the elements or
preconditions for liability" to prevail against the secondary actors.79 The Court
held, of course, that plaintiffs did not satisfy the reliance element because the al-
leged "deceptive acts, which were not disclosed to the investing public, [we]re too
remote" to constitute reliance."0
D. Refining the Private Attorney General Model
The Stoneridge Court's refusal to expand the universe of Rule 10b-5 defendants is
illustrative of the Court's recent approach that is reformulating the private attorney
general model for both securities and antitrust cases.8" This approach does not
disapprove of the class action as a way to enforce federal law, but instead embraces
a less ambitious and more nuanced view about the ability of class action plaintiff
attorneys to become effective private attorneys general.8 2 The Court seems to be
increasingly responding to the potential for abuse in these actions, and the costs to
companies and the economy. 3 Rather than allowing these actions to proliferate as
the Court did in the past, 4 the Court has instead limited class actions either out-
right 5 or by providing lower courts with tools to dismiss the actions that are not
likely meritorious. 6 At the same time, the Court has placed greater emphasis on
government enforcement, i.e., the public attorney general (or SEC, state authori-
ties, etc.).8 7 While this is not the end of class actions-they will continue to be a
78. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 770.
81. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1.
82. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007). Indeed, Justice Ginsburg,
writing for the majority in 2007, began her opinion by stating that the Supreme Court "has long recognized
that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to
criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)." Id. Her next sentence, of course, pointed out that "[pirivate
securities fraud actions ... if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs
on companies and individuals whose conduct conforms to the law." Id.
83. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772 ("Overseas firms with no other exposure to our securities laws could be
deterred from doing business here .... This, in turn, may raise the cost of being a publicly traded company
under our law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.").
84. See Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 250 (1988) (stating that
it is appropriate to adopt "a presumption of reliance supported by the fraud-on-the-market theory" and thus
allowing certification of the class).
85. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 761 (indicating that the Court did not permit expansion of private rights
of action because of extensive discovery); Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1.
86. See Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971 (2007) (dismissing a claim alleging conspiracy for
failing to plead facts demonstrating plausibility); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346-48 (2005)
(dismissing a complaint for securities fraud for failing to state an economic loss and a causal connection).
87. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773 ("Secondary actors are subject to criminal penalties ... and civil enforce-
ment by the SEC .... The enforcement power is not toothless."); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, v. Billing, 127
S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007) (" [Alny enforcement- related need for an antitrust lawsuit is unusually small.... [Tihe
SEC actively enforces the rules and regulations that forbid the conduct in question.").
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significant force-the private attorney general concept may have already passed its
peak."8 It will, of course, be interesting to see if recent economic turmoil and criti-
cism of abusive business practices lead to calls for greater private attorney general
power, especially in light of concerns that regulators were not sufficiently vigilant.
1. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores
The Supreme Court did not just recently "discover" that private class actions could
lead to abuse. Indeed, in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 9 the Court in
1975 expressed deep concern about frivolous class action lawsuits.9" The Court rec-
ognized that
even a complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from being
resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment.9 '
The Stoneridge Court pointed to this same concern-weak-claimed plaintiffs ex-
torting settlements from non-guilty companies-when it declined to expand secur-
ities liability to secondary actors.92
Besides extortionate settlements, the Blue Chip Court recognized that the "very
pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the de-
fendant which is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.9 3 For example, a defendant with
an upcoming securities offering may be forced to delay or abandon it during the
lawsuit. Moreover, corporate officers, instead of focusing on creating shareholder
value, are meeting with lawyers and taking depositions.
Interestingly, whereas in Stoneridge the Court limited the potential defendants to
Rule 10b-5 cases,94 the Blue Chip Court limited the number of potential plaintiffs
by holding that initiators of a stock offering cannot sue under that implied cause of
action "where they have neither purchased nor sold any of the offered shares." '5
88. See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 2135 & n.32 (noting that use of the "private attorney general" term
began skyrocketing in the 1970's and increased steadily each decade to the present).
89. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
90. Id. at 740. The Court was particularly concerned about Rule 10b-5 suits, stating that "Itlhere has been
widespread recognition that litigation under Rule lob-5 presents a danger of vexatiousness different in degree
and in kind from that which accompanies litigation in general." Id. at 739.
91. Id. at 740.
92. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772 ("In Blue Chip, the Court noted that extensive discovery and the potential
for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort settlements from inno-
cent companies.").
93. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 740.
94. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 773.
95. Blue Chip, 421 U.S. at 725, 754-55.
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The concerns the Supreme Court expressed in 1975 in Blue Chip previewed the
action the Supreme Court is taking now in both antitrust and securities cases.96
2. Congress
The Supreme Court often "takes its cues from Congress" and the public.97 The
PLSRA's passage was a giant signal to "rein in" abusive class action litigation."
Indeed, in Tellabs, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in 2007 that, "[a]s a check
against abusive litigation by private parties, Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995." 9 One method that Congress employed to try to
check the abusive litigation is by requiring "[e]xacting pleading requirements" for
Rule 10b-5 cases."° "The Act requires plaintiffs to state with particularity both the
facts constituting the alleged violation, and the facts evidencing scienter, i.e., the
defendant's intention 'to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.'"°" Creating a height-
ened pleading standard should have two effects. The first is that class action attor-
neys will decline to file some cases that they would have filed before the PSLRA
because those cases are likely to be dismissed, and are therefore not as profitable. °2
Second, the higher standard provides courts with a tool to more easily clear their
docket of cases that lack merit.0 3 According to some commentators, however, "the
reforms set out by the Act did not create much change."'0 4
Congress could have-but did not-eliminate the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption for reliance.'05 That would have mostly killed securities class actions be-
cause without that presumption it would have been very difficult for private
attorneys general to obtain class certification. °6 This suggests that Congress did not
want to eliminate securities class actions, but instead wanted to filter out the less
96. This is not to say that the Supreme Court did nothing between Blue Chip and recent cases to limit the
surge of private attorney general class actions. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). Rather, the Court has recently taken increased steps to "regulate" these
suits. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1.
97. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 45 (2005).
98. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1-2.
99. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007).
100. Id.; see also Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007) ("We also note that
Congress, in an effort to weed out unmeritorious securities lawsuits, has recently tightened the procedural
requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy when they file those suits.").
101. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2504 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 & n.12 (1976)).
102. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 2 (John M.
Olin Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 07-008, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=975301
("[P]rocedural barriers of the PSLRA likely raised the cost to plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue a class action and
reduced the expected outcome from litigation.").
103. See Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2396 (noting heightened pleading standards permit courts to dismiss
unmeritorious claims).
104. Gillespie, supra note 17, at 175. But see Pritchard, supra note 40, at 31 ("This means that securities class
actions are now brought when the evidence of fraud is relatively obvious.").
105. Pritchard, supra note 40, at 31.
106. Id.
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meritorious ones." 7 The Supreme Court in recent decisions has taken the same
approach of reaching decisions that support the continued existence of the private
attorney general, but at the same time paring back its scope."0 8
Congress again signaled its concern about abusive and costly class actions when
it passed the Class Action Fairness Act in 2005."' Among other reforms, this Act
expanded federal jurisdiction over class actions, even when those actions involved
state law claims."' This Act reacted to concern that class actions-although a legiti-
mate method to obtain relief-have been disproportionately abused at the state
level."' These abuses "undermined the national judicial system, the flow of inter-
state commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction."' 2 Moreover, plaintiff
attorneys were filing national cases in state courts, and as a result states often im-
posed their own law on residents of other states." 3 Shuttling these cases to federal
court was one method that Congress determined would help pare down abusive
and unmeritorious class actions. 114
Perhaps responding to one or both of these acts, and other concerns expressed
about class actions, 15 the Supreme Court has recently issued several antitrust and
securities litigation opinions that do not eliminate, but instead significantly limit
the role of the private attorney general in favor of government enforcement." 6
107. Id. (explaining that instead of changing the fraud-on-the-market presumption, Congress created pro-
cedural barriers to make class actions more difficult to pursue).
108. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 773-74 (2008) (noting
all secondary actors are not immune from private suit, but rather a claim is limited as against secondary actors
committing primary violations); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007)
("recogniz[ing] that meritorious private actions ... are an essential supplement to ... actions brought ... by
the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)," but private actions must be
adequately contained to avoid abuse).
109. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4-5 (2005).
110. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2000); Warren W. Harris & Erin Glenn
Busby, Highlights of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 72 DEF. CouNs. J. 228, 228 (2005).
111. Harris & Busby, supra note 110, at 228-29. The PSLRA "prompted at least some members of the
plaintiffs' bar to avoid the federal forum altogether" and file analogous state claims in state court. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82 (2006). As a result, Congress passed the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA), which denied plaintiffs the right to the class action device to
vindicate many of these claims. Id. at 82-83 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f)(l) (2000)).
112. Harris & Busby, supra note 110, at 229.
113. Id.
114. See id.
115. See, e.g., Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4,
6-11, Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. & Motorola, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008) (No. 06-
43) (discussing abusive securities litigation).
116. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2504 (2007); Dura Pharm., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (noting the PSLRA permits private securities actions but requires heightened
pleading specificity).
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3. Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP
Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,"7 confronted the need for private antitrust
attorneys general in the face of a detailed regulatory structure in the telecommuni-
cations industry."' Verizon Communications arose out of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 and certain duties that the act imposed upon incumbent local tele-
phone companies to facilitate market entry by competitors." 9 The Court consid-
ered "whether a complaint alleging breach of the incumbent's duty under the 1996
Act to share its network with competitors states a claim under § 2 of the Sherman
Act ...."2 In examining whether traditional antitrust principles justify adding this"case to the few existing exceptions from the proposition that there is no duty to
aid competitors," the Court analyzed whether private enforcement was necessary in
these circumstances. 2' In doing so, the Court recognized that where there already is
a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm, "the
additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be
small." 2 2 Indeed, "[t]he cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion
of § 2 liability." 23 In contrast, absent such a regulatory structure, "the benefits of
antitrust are worth its sometimes considerable disadvantages.' 24
The Court's analysis is significant because it recognizes that the private attorney
general-in the vehicle of private antitrust actions-should be held in check (or at
least slowed down) if there already is a government enforcement mechanism in
place. 2  The Court recognizes that there are both benefits and costs to these law-
suits, 26 and it defers not to the private attorney general, but to the regulatory
agency.'27
117. 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
118. Id. at 412.
119. Id. at 401.
120. Id. The Court dismissed the possibility of antitrust immunity because the 1996 Act had an antitrust-
specific savings clause. Id. at 406.
121. Id. at 411.
122. Id. at 412.
123. Id. at 414.
124. Id. at 412.
125. Id. (noting "the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive
harm" limits the necessity of private action).
126. Id. at 412, 414.
127. Id. at 415. In a rather significant pronouncement, Justice Scalia stated that "[ain antitrust court is
unlikely to be an effective day-to-day enforcer," but rather regulatory agencies are more appropriate
enforcers. Id.
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4. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo
The next term, in 2005, the Court decided a securities case entitled Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo"' Here, the Court considered what plaintiffs must
plead to satisfy the "loss causation" element for lob-5.' 29 The Ninth Circuit took a
very lenient view, and only required plaintiffs to allege that "'the price' of the se-
curity 'on the date of purchase was inflated because of the misrepresentation.'" 130
The Court rejected that standard, and held that plaintiffs must instead plead that
they suffered an actual economic loss as a result of the challenged actions. 3' Echo-
ing its 1975 Blue Chip decision, the Court noted that the lower Ninth Circuit stan-
dard would permit plaintiffs with largely groundless claims to file suit and obtain
extortionate settlements.'32 This, the Court stated, "would tend to transform a pri-
vate securities action into a partial downside insurance policy."'33 This case is an-
other recent example of the Supreme Court limiting the private attorney general
concept in such a way as to diminish the number of frivolous and unmeritorious
lawsuits filed. "'34
5. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing,'35 like Verizon Communications 36 de-
cided a few years earlier, required the Supreme Court to reconcile a detailed regula-
tory regime with private attorney general antitrust lawsuits.'37 Unlike Verizon
Communications, however, implied antitrust immunity was at issue in Credit
Suisse. 31 More specifically, the Supreme Court declared that particular IPO stock
underwriting practices were off-limits to the antitrust laws because these laws were
impliedly preempted by the securities laws.3 9 Private attorney general plaintiffs'
counsel brought an antitrust class action on behalf of securities purchasers against
several underwriters alleging that their "tying" and "laddering" arrangements
grossly inflated the prices of the affected securities and violated the federal antitrust
laws. 140
128. 544 U.S. 336 (2005). See generally Gillespie, supra note 17 (giving an excellent analysis of this
decision).
129. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S. at 338.
130. Id. (quoting Broudo v. Dura Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original),
rev'd, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)).
131. Id. at 347.
132. Id. (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)).
133. Id. at 347-48.
134. See id.
135. 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
136. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
137. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2387.
138. Compare id. (providing examples of statutes that preclude application of antitrust laws), with Verizon
Commc'ns, 540 U.S. at 406 (stating the principle that congressional creation of sharing duties under section
251(c) does not automatically allow those duties to be enforced via an antitrust claim).
139. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2387.
140. Id.
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The issue was whether there is a conflict between private antitrust lawsuits and
the securities regulatory regime that "rises to the level of incompatibility. 14' Here,
Justice Stephen Breyer came up with another limiting factor for the private attor-
ney general model: it is inferior to "expert" agency enforcement for complex sub-
ject matter that requires the drawing of a "fine, complex, detailed line" separating
legal from illegal activity.' Justice Breyer points out that "to distinguish what is
forbidden from what is allowed requires an understanding of just when, in relation
to services provided, a commission is 'excessive,' indeed, so 'excessive' that it will
remain permanently forbidden."'43 "And who," asks Justice Breyer, "but the SEC
itself could do so with confidence?"' 44 At the same time, the Court was concerned
that private attorney general actions will just cause problems when it stated, "anti-
trust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the Nation in dozens of different
courts with different nonexpert judges and different nonexpert juries."'45 Justice
Breyer continued by stating that "[i] n light of the nuanced nature of the evidentiary
evaluations necessary to separate the permissible from the impermissible, it will
prove difficult for those many different courts to reach consistent results."'46
Continuing the analysis, the Court, as in Verizon Communications,147 balanced
the benefits and harm of supplemental private attorney general enforcement."' The
Court noted that in light of the complex regulatory structure, "any enforcement-
related need for an antitrust lawsuit is unusually small."'49 This is because "the SEC
actively enforces the rules and regulations that forbid the conduct in question," and
that "the SEC is itself required to take account of competitive considerations when
it creates securities-related policy and embodies it in rules and regulations."'5 ° As a
result, "it [is] somewhat less necessary to rely upon antitrust actions to address
anticompetitive behavior."' 5 ' Once again, it appears that the Court decided that it
trusted government enforcement a lot more than the private attorney general
model. Indeed, the Court was concerned that private attorney general enforcement
would disrupt the government regulation. 2 Of course, government regulation has
141. Id. at 2393.
142. Id. at 2394.
143. Id. at 2395 (emphasis in original).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
148. Credit Suisse, 127 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
149. Id. at 2396.
150. Id.
151. Id. The Court also referenced the PSLRA, and expressed concern that permitting antitrust lawsuits
"risks circumventing these requirements by permitting plaintiffs to dress what is essentially a securities com-
plaint in antitrust clothing." Id.
152. Id. at 2395.
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recently come under fire for its perceived failure to stop certain business practices
that many believe led to collapsing credit markets and economic turmoil.'53
6. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.
The Supreme Court's 2007 antitrust decision in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.'s4 did not involve a class action, but it did result in a change in
substantive law that narrows opportunities for antitrust class actions.' 5 In overrul-
ing almost one-hundred years of precedent,5 6 the Court declared that vertical
agreements between manufacturers and retailers to set minimum prices for the
manufacturers' goods would be subject to the rule-of-reason, instead of the per se
rule. "'57 This is significant for prospective antitrust cases because the "rule-of-reason
claim is much more difficult and expensive to prove, and plaintiffs are thus less
likely to challenge these agreements." 5 ' In reaching this decision, the Court noted
that per se rules "may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous suits against
legitimate practices."'5 9 Not surprisingly, the Court was very conscious of the costs
and abuses possible in antitrust litigation.
7. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
The Supreme Court issued another antitrust opinion in 2007-the court issued
four in total' 6 -that provided courts in antitrust cases (and other complex federal
actions) with a tool to filter out unmeritorious cases.' 6' In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, the Court held that private attorneys general who assert an antitrust con-
spiracy cannot survive a motion to dismiss unless they allege more than a bare
allegation of conspiracy and that defendants engaged in consciously parallel behav-
ior.'62 The Court did not elevate pleading standards (as Congress did for the
153. See Yaron Brook, Commentary, The Government Did It, FORBES, July 18, 2008, available at http://www.
forbes.com/2008/07/18/fannie- freddie-regulation-oped-cx-yb_0718brook.html.
154. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).
155. Id. at 2710 ("The Court has abandoned the rule of per se illegality for other vertical restraints a manu-
facturer imposes on its distributors.").
156. See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative,
127 S. Ct. at 2710.
157. Leegin Creative, 127 S. Ct. at 2721.
158. Carl W. Hittinger & Jarod M. Bona, Supreme Court Decisions Weaken Antitrust Laws, EXECUTIVE
CouNs., March/April 2008, at 40, 40.
159. Leegin Creative, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
160. See Carl W. Hittinger & larod M. Bona, Recent High Court Rulings Don't Deserve 'Pro-Business' Label,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 8, 2008, http://www.law.com/jsp/PubArticle.jsp?id=900005508066 (analyzing
the four antitrust cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court during its 2006-07 term).
161. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1982 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1966 (majority opinion). Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent and stated that the Court
should have instructed the antitrust defense bar "among whom 'lament' as to inadequate judicial supervision of
discovery is most 'common' . . . that their remedy was to seek to amend the Federal rules-not our interpreta-
tion of them." Id. at 1988 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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PSLRA), but it did add some content to the standard pleading requirements.6
Namely, the Court required that complaints state enough facts "to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face."'" The Court also empathized with antitrust
defendants, pointing out that "it is one thing to be cautious before dismissing an
antitrust complaint in advance of discovery . . . but quite another to forget that
proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive." '65 It will take lower courts
many years to sort out exactly what this "plausible" requirement means, but in any
event, it represents further erosion of the private attorney general model. Thus far,
the lower courts have issued varying interpretations of Twombly' 66
8. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.
The Supreme Court's securities decision that same term in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.167 provided a very direct articulation of the Court's present
thinking about the private attorney general. 61 Justice Ginsburg started her majority
opinion by praising the private attorney general: "This Court has long recognized
that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud securities laws are an
essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC)."169 Her next sentence, however, added a bit of caution by stat-
ing that "[p]rivate securities fraud actions, however, if not adequately contained,
can be employed abusively to impose substantial costs on companies and individu-
als whose conduct conforms to the law.""'7 These two statements illustrate the
Court's approach to the private attorney general: supportive, but with a more elab-
orate structure to minimize costs and abuses.'7 ' This approach is consistent with
what the Court interpreted to be the PSLRA's twin goals, that is "to curb frivolous,
lawyer-driven litigation, while preserving investors' ability to recover on meritori-
ous claims.""'
163. Id. at 1974 (majority opinion) ("[W]e do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.").
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1966-67.
166. Compare Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal of
wrongful death claim because plaintiff failed to plead commission of affirmative acts exposing decedent to
danger as required under state-created danger doctrine), with In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 48-49
(2d Cir. 2007) (upholding dismissal of price fixing claim against elevator companies on grounds that purchas-
ers failed to meet pleading requirements), and Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding dismissal of Sherman Act allegation of setting credit card transaction fees because plaintiffs failed
to specifically state Sherman Act restraint of trade claim against banks).
167. 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2504.
170. Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 2509.
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In Tellabs, the Supreme Court interpreted the PSLRA's scienter standard to re-
quire that a plaintiff alleging fraud in a section 10(b) action "must plead facts
rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely as any plausible opposing infer-
ence."'73 This is a more difficult standard to reach than the Seventh Circuit stan-
dard that was on review.'74 As in Leegin, this substantive interpretation will likely
limit private attorney general actions.
9. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.
Finally, in Stoneridge, the Court continued its pattern of limiting private attorney
general enforcement in favor of government enforcement.'75 As discussed above,' 76
the Court declined to allow private attorneys general to sue secondary actors under
Rule 10(b) when the alleged bad acts are in the "realm of ordinary business opera-
tions."'7  The plaintiff attempted to expand the fraud-on-the-Imarket theory'78 to
ordinary business practices by arguing that "in an efficient market investors rely not
only upon the public statements relating to a security but also upon the transac-
tions those statements reflect."' 79 The Court, however, decided that the fraud-on-
the-market theory had gone far enough and stated that "[w]ere this concept of
reliance to be adopted, the implied cause of action would reach the whole market-
place in which the issuing company does business; and there is no authority for this
rule."'
The Court was concerned that overactive private attorneys general would begin
to hurt our economy. For example, the Court speculated that "[o]verseas firms
with no other exposure to our securities laws could be deterred from doing busi-
ness here."' 8 ' And this could "raise the cost of being a publicly traded company
under our law and shift securities offerings away from domestic capital markets.'1 82
As in other recent cases, the Court once again decided to rely on government en-
173. Id. at 2513.
174. Id. at 2506.
175. See Pritchard, supra note 40, at 1-2. A.C. Pritchard argues that the Court chose to base its decision on
the "reliance" element because that element does not apply to government enforcement actions. Id. at 18. Thus,
the Court was able to cabin private litigation, while at the same time, not affecting government enforcement of
the same conduct. Id. According to Pritchard, "[plutting the limit on secondary party liability in the reliance
element allowed the Court to have its cake-unfettered government enforcement-and eat it too-constrain
the scope of private actions." Id.
176. See supra Part I.C.
177. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 770 (2008).
178. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
179. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770; see also Hunt v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 538 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2008)
(rejecting similar efficient market theory for justifiable reliance requirement for Pennsylvania Consumer Pro-
tection Law).
180. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 770. In Pugh v. Tribune Co., the Seventh Circuit interpreted Stoneridge to hold
that "an indirect chain to the contents of false public statements is too remote to establish primary liability."
521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, the Court directly applied Stoneridge to uphold dismissal of a securi-
ties complaint. Id.
181. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 772.
182. Id.
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
CARL W. HITTINGER & JAROD M. BONA
forcement to stem any bad conduct.'83 Thus, at the end of its opinion, the Court
reassures us that these secondary actors are subject to criminal penalties and SEC
civil enforcement. 84 Finally, the Court noted, "some state securities laws permit
state authorities to seek fines and restitution from aiders and abettors.' 8 5
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the three-justice dissent and, interestingly, noted
that "[t]he Court seems to assume that respondents' alleged conduct could subject
them to liability in an enforcement proceeding initiated by the Government... but
nevertheless concludes that they are not subject to liability in a private action
brought by injured investors . 1..."86 That is exactly what the Court did: the Court
chose government enforcement over private attorney general enforcement.
III. CONCLUSION
Stoneridge represents the continuation of the Court's recent reformulation of the
private attorney general model.'87 While the Court is still supporting the class ac-
tion as a way to enforce the federal securities and antitrust laws, it is showing more
restraint and caution in allowing these suits to proliferate." 8 The Court is instead
placing more reliance on government enforcers.'89 Not surprisingly, some private
plaintiffs' class action counsel-as legal bounty hunters-have attorneys' fees as
their primary motivation.190 While this mechanism is effective in encouraging pri-
vate parties to enforce federal law, it has also lead to abuse, high costs, and lower
economic efficiency.' 9' Moreover, as commentators have pointed out, these lawsuits
often are just piggy-back lawsuits on government enforcement efforts, so they may
not necessarily broaden the scope of law enforcement.'92 They may instead just
intensify the penalty.'93 It appears that the current Supreme Court is well aware of
the costs and benefits of the private attorney general model and will continue to
refine the private attorney general model by narrowing its scope and providing
courts with tools to filter out unmeritorious cases early in the litigation.'94
Eventually, however, as is often the case, the pendulum may swing back in the
other direction. This could result from one or more of many possible catalysts: a
change in the composition of the Supreme Court, an Act of Congress (maybe from
heavy lobbying by the trial bar), highly publicized business scandals, or even public
183. Id. at 773-74.
184. Id. at 773.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 774 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. See supra Part II.D.9.
188. See supra Part 1.D.
189. See supra Part II.A.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Coffee, supra note 13, at 223-24.
193. See id. at 224.
194. See supra Part II.D.
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criticism of government enforcers for enforcement that is too harsh, too lenient, or
too corrupt, or a new administration in the White House that has a differing view
of the role of, in particular, the scope and purpose of the antitrust and securities
laws. 195
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195. See Carl W. Hittinger & Nicholas T. Solosky, The Candidates and Antitrust Enforcement: Changes Are
Coming, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 6, 2008, available at http://www.dlapiper.com/files/upload/The-Legal
_lntelligencer_Oct6_08.pdf.
